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Abstract - Communication networks and distributed technologies 
move people towards the era of ubiquitous computing. An 
ubiquitous environment needs many authentication sensors for 
users recognition, in order to provide a secure infrastructure for 
both user access to resources and services and information 
management. Today the security requirements must ensure 
secure and trusted user information to protect sensitive data 
resource access and they could be used for user traceability inside 
the platform. Conventional authentication systems, based on 
username and password, are in crisis since they are not able to 
guarantee a suitable security level for several applications. 
Biometric authentication systems represent a valid alternative to 
the conventional authentication systems providing a flexible e-
infrastructure towards an integrated solution supporting the 
requirement for improved inter-organizational functionality. In 
this work the study and the implementation of a fingerprints-
based embedded biometric system is proposed. Typical strategies 
implemented in Identity Management Systems could be useful to 
protect biometric information. The proposed sensor can be seen 
as a self-contained sensor: it performs the all elaboration steps on 
board, a necessary requisite to strengthen security, so that 
sensible data are securely managed and stored inside the sensor, 
without any data leaking out. The sensor has been prototyped via 
an FPGA-based platform achieving fast execution time and a 
good final throughput. Resources used, elaboration times of the 
sensor are reported. Finally, recognition rates of the proposed 
embedded biometric sensor have been evaluated considering 
three different databases: the FVC2002 reference database, the 
CSAI/Biometrika proprietary database, and the CSAI/Secugen 
proprietary database. The best achieved FAR and FRR indexes 
are respectively 1.07% and 8.33%, with an elaboration time of 
183.32 ms and a working frequency of 22.5 MHz.  
KEYWORDS: Self-contained sensor; Biometric identity 
management; Fingerprints; Ubiquitous authentication; Embedded 
system;, FPGA rapid prototyping. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ubiquitous and distributed applications are changing the 
way people communicate, providing services and 
functionalities, supported by computer networks. Secure 
access system design is one of the main issues to be 
considered in ubiquitous and distributed environments [9]. 
These systems must provide secure access services: this is a 
serious problem because ubiquitous computing applications 
typically involve interactions among a large number of entities 
(e.g. people, server, etc…) across different organizations. 
Ubiquitous accesses are usually realized through many access-
points and a central database [1]. With more details, the main 
goal of a distributed system is to connect users and resources 
in a transparent, open, and scalable way. For this reason, one 
of the fundamental characteristics of distributed systems is its 
openness. This property is such that each subsystem is open to 
interaction with other systems, through standard web services 
protocols which enable distributed systems to be extended and 
scaled. 
Unconstrained entities interaction and uncontrolled 
information disclosure are the main problems regarding 
openness of distributed systems, because unauthorized use and 
information exchange may have extremely grave 
consequences about security and integrity of the system. 
The requirement of trusted access-point [2] involves a 
greater computational load from applications, because it must 
provide additional functionalities, for authentication and 
credentials verification, to guarantee an high security level for 
each system’s access-point [2] [8]. Locally and remote 
authentication is necessary because people must be able to 
access services and information from everywhere. 
The conventional authentication systems (based on 
username and password) are not able to guarantee a suitable 
protection level for the transmitted information. The security 
user should be the main point of any software application 
dealing with personal information. Unlike passwords, user 
biometric information is unchangeable. Physical and 
behavioral people characteristics constitute the core of 
biometric systems: the biometric identity has the advantage to 
guarantee that only the authorized users have access to 
available resources and services [9]. 
In literature many approaches have been proposed and 
many software systems have been implemented to develop 
software recognition systems: in [7] a software algorithm for 
multimodal identification based on fingerprint and iris is 
proposed. This approach is based on a particular fusion at 
features level to increase the system performance in terms of 
accuracy. In [8] an hardware fingerprint recognition system is 
presented and realized using the Precise Biometrics PB100MC 
device, as image scanner, and the Celoxica RC1000 board, 
employing a Xilinx VirtexE2000 FPGA, as fingerprint 
processing module. In 2004 IBM released a second generation 
of notebook Thinkpad T42 models [18] equipped with an 
integrated fingerprint reader produced by UPEK [19]. UPEK 
TouchStrip is an USB device performing the matching 
algorithm in hardware: it is a compact CMOS capacitive 
silicon-based strip sensor (TCS3) for fingerprint acquisition 
plus a powerful ASIC (TCD4) for fingerprint matching and 
secure data transfer. However, IBM does not give any 
information about the database used for the T42 system 
testing. 
In this work, a fingerprint recognizer has been 
implemented and proposed for a secure biometric identity 
management system. The main objectives of the proposed 
biometric sensor are to overcome some limits of the 
conventional software fingerprint recognition systems, such as 
user interaction speed and resistance to attacks related to the 
biometric data transmission and management. With this 
approach, the proposed system can be considered as a self-
contained biometric sensor. 
FAR (False Acceptance Rate, related to not authorized 
users that are admitted) and FRR (False Rejection Rate, 
related to authorized users that are rejected) indexes have been 
used to evaluate the performance of the proposed system. 
Different tests have been performed on three databases: FVC 
standard database, CSAI/Biometrika and CSAI/Secugen, two 
proprietary databases: a FAR of about 1% and a FRR of about 
8% represents the best trade-off obtained. 
The paper is organized as follow. Section II illustrates the 
problems related ubiquitous authentication and security. 
Section III describes the proposed embedded sensor. Section 
IV illustrates each phase of fingerprint processing chain. 
Section V presents the experimental results in terms of 
elaboration times and recognition rates. Finally, section VI 
reports the conclusions of this work. 
II. UBIQUITOUS AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY 
Conventional authentication methodology, based on 
username and password, is the easiest people authentication 
method to implement and to use, but it is not sufficient for 
these applications, as distributed systems, that need high data 
protection. Many limitations can be found in this approach, 
such as easiness to forget, lose and intercept the username or 
the password, therefore it aren’t suitable for distributed 
systems. The most secure and effective personal authentication 
and identity management method involve the verification of a 
unique and personal biometric characteristic. Identity 
management is related to the registration, storage, protection, 
issuance and assurance of a user’s personal identifier in an 
electronic environment. 
A secure infrastructure is necessary for ubiquitous 
authentication, where all people could be reliably 
authenticated. Trustiness is an essential requirement for these 
systems and networks, whose transactions can be performed 
without any compromise. Critical IT services supplied to 
people (e.g. banking, where credit card accounts or other 
personal information cannot be shared or stolen) need a high 
grade of security. An ubiquitous authentication system can be 
seen as a specialized sensor that reduces the points-of-attack 
of conventional authentication systems and that gives the 
capability to authenticate people in secure manner, across 
applications and networks. 
Software and hardware systems for fingerprints 
recognition represent alternative solutions of strong and robust 
user authentication. In reference to the vulnerability, a 
recognition system can be considered secure and  trusted only 
if it withstands some typical attacks [1]: Replay Attacks (due 
to the replication of the information elaborated during the 
authentication process), Communication Attacks (evaluated in 
terms of resistance to the information interception), Database 
Attacks (regarding the information manipulation of the 
contained in the system database). 
A possible choice could be the implementation of an 
embedded database, since biometric information are encrypted 
and stored in the memory, tamper-resistant device. In addition, 
the biometric sensor has on board all the information needed 
to perform the whole user authentication task. No sensible 
biometric information is transmitted between client and server, 
or networked workstations before the positive user 
authentication. 
III. THE PROPOSED EMBEDDED SENSOR 
In this work the authors present a fingerprint based 
embedded sensor. Both the enrollment phase and the 
authentication phase have been developed for sensor 
employment in real ubiquitous environments. Fingerprint 
processing as well as fingerprint-templates matching are on-
board executed without any information transmission before a 
positive authentication. The proposed sensor acquires a 
fingerprint image, processes it and, in matching phase, gives a 
similarity index used for user authentication. Considering the 
functionalities of the system components, three main modules 
can be identified [8]: User Interface Module (UIM), System 
Processing Module (SPM), Sensor Acquisition Module 
(SAM). The UIM allows user to interact with the enrollment 
and authentication functionalities provided by the system. The 
SAM deals with fingerprint image acquisition. The SPM, the 
FPGA-based fingerprint processing engine, implements the 
whole recognition chain and the cryptographic capabilities of 
the sensor. 
In Fig.1 the UIM, the SAM, and the SPM with their 
interconnections are depicted: using the functionalities offered 
by the UIM, the sensor through the SAM acquires a 
fingerprint image. Subsequently the acquired image is sent to 
the SPM using both the host expansion bus and the host PCI 
bus.  
 
Fig. 1. The proposed system modules: the User Interface Module (UIM), the 
System Processing Module (SPM), the Sensor Acquisition Module (SAM) 
and their main interactions. 
 
The SPM prototype has been developed on the Celoxica 
RC1000 board equipped with a 2M gates Xilinx VirtexE2000 
FPGA. SPM communications use only the host PCI bus and 
its clock has been set to 22.5 MHz in order to guarantee the 
correct data exchange between FPGA and board RAM that is 
used to store the encrypted fingerprint templates. Exploiting 
the high data parallelism of the application domain, processing 
algorithms have been parallelized and fingerprint processing 
phases have been pipelined to decrease system execution time.  
A. The Self-Contained Fingerprint Sensor 
The main objectives of the proposed sensor are to 
overcome some limits of the conventional software fingerprint 
recognition systems (user interaction speed and attacks 
resistance related to biometric data transmission and 
management). The proposed fingerprint recognizer can be 
seen as a self-contained biometric sensor. The self-contained 
sensor has been realized using a fingerprint image scanner and 
the Celoxica RC1000 board [13], as fingerprint processing 
engine. For this type of biometric sensors, one of the most 
important phases is the minutiae extraction and their storage in 
the board. Fingerprint minutiae extraction is a complex job, 
depending on many factors (a software implementation, from 
the point of view of the elaboration times, constitutes a bottle-
neck) thus the fingerprint processing chain is implemented and 
executed on a FPGA based device. Besides, to increase 
security, the biometric templates are encrypted and stored on 
the board RAM. With this approach, the biometric sensor will 
contain all the information/data needed to perform user 
authentication without information transmission through the 
network or server/workstation [4][15]: 
 the FPGA allows to resolve the safety problems in the 
treatment of the biometric characteristics (Replay 
Attack); 
 the AES (Advances Encryption Standard) used to 
encrypt/decrypt the biometric signatures, avoid to 
transmit plain-text information, making unusable the 
biometrics greatness intercepted (Communication 
Attack); 
 the system interacts with the embedded database, 
encrypted and stored in the FPGA memory, so that the 
problem of unauthorized access to the biometric 
signatures (Database Attack) can be exceeded. 
Besides, the choice of a FPGA implementation exceeds 
software system general problems, such as performance and 
response time. 
IV. FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION PHASES 
A. FPGA Fingerprint Preprocessing 
Normalization: it reduces the data-noise before image is 
submitted to thinning and minutiae extraction modules. The 
normalization allows to the grey levels of original image 
(Fig.2a) to converge around an average value with a desired 
variance (Fig.2b). 
Binarization: it gives out an image where pixels assume a 
binary value (Fig.2c). The binarization is performed applying 
two different elaborations to the input image: an average filter 
and a thresholding operation with two different thresholds. 
Thinning: it reduces the ridges thickness to the unitary 
value (Fig.2d), using the Zhang-Suen algorithm [10]. This 
algorithm gives the opportunity to a parallel implementation 
with a two stage pipeline. For the realization of the thinning 
algorithm on FPGA, a 3x3 mask has been used in order to 
implement the two steps pipeline. 
 
 
Fig. 2. FVC database fingerprint images: original image (a), normalized image 
(b), binarized image (c), and thinned image (d). 
B. FPGA Fingerprint Minutiae Extraction 
For the minutiae extraction phase the Tico-Kuosmanem 
algorithm [11] has been used. In our implementation, two 
further procedures have been added to traditional algorithm 
implementation: the first step asks for analysis and 
individualization of minutiae type (i.e. ending and bifurcation 
points), the second step is necessary to erase the false 
minutiae. The hardware implementation takes advantage of the 
nature of the used algorithm: pipeline stages have been used 
(a) (b) (c) (d)
for minutiae extraction. Fig.3 shows the fingerprint minutiae 
extraction phase. After, the biometric template is created from 
these extracted points. 
For security constraints, the biometric templates are 
encrypted using AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) 
algorithm [12]. 
 
Fig. 3. Example of detected minutiae. 
C. FPGA Fingerprint Template Matching 
Several algorithms are available for fingerprint template 
matching [6]. Those based on pattern matching give the best 
performance on hardware, due their possibility of parallel 
implementation.  
 
Fig. 4. Enrollment and authentication phases of the prototyped embedded self-
contained sensor. 
 
In the procedure that brings the user to its authentication, 
two phases can be detected (Fig.4): 
 off-line phase: user fingerprints are acquired and 
processed for creating the biometric templates. 
 on-line phase: the registered user is authorized to 
access system services and resources after a positive 
authentication involving the stored fingerprint 
templates and the on-line acquired item. 
The algorithm executes a pattern matching task between 
two biometric templates, lining-up the patterns with roto-
translation transformation. As result, the algorithm gives a 
similarity score among two fingerprints. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section illustrates features and results of the 
prototyped sensor. The achieved experimental results, in terms 
of resources analysis, times analysis, performance analysis and 
recognitions rates are also shown. 
A. Hardware Components 
The FPGA based board used for sensor prototyping is the 
Celoxica RC1000 board [13], an internal board on PCI bus, 
equipped with the Xilinx VirtexE2000 FPGA, 8MB of RAM 
and a programmable clock. The two used fingerprint scanners 
are the Secugen Hamster FDP02 [16] and the Biometrika 
FX2000 [17]. These scanners are compatible with BioAPI 
Consortium libraries [5], leaving ample room for the 
developing of the communication protocol between scanners 
and processing engine.  
B. Execution Times 
The proposed self-contained sensor takes advantage of 
FPGA technologies previously described. Table I illustrates 
the elaboration times required by each single task of the 
authentication process, with a working frequency of 22.5 
MHz. The fingerprint image is acquired with Secugen 
Hamster scanner, and transferred to the FPGA processing 
engine. 
Table I. Elaboration times of each task with the Secugen Hamster scanner. 
The working frequency is 22.5 MHz. 
Processing Task Processing Time (ms) 
Normalization 5.24 
Binarization 4.36 
Thinning 78.02 
Minutiae Extraction 27.4 
AES Encryption 29.6 
AES Decryption 31.2 
Matching 7.5 
TOTAL TIME 183.32 
 
C. Resources analysis 
The development environments used in the prototyping 
phase were the Celoxica DK2 [14] and Xilinx ISE [15]. Table 
II illustrates the FPGA resources required by every processing 
task.  
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Table II. Resources used by each processing task. 
Processing 
Task Slice Number Slice (%) LUT Number LUT (%) 
Normalization 91 0.47 102 0.26 
Binarization 113 0.59 95 0.25 
Thinning 358 1.86 442 1.15 
Minutiae 
Detection 12491 65.06 22518 58.64 
AES 5967 31.08 13538 35.26 
Matching 129 0.67 109 0.28 
 
Table III illustrates the global percentages of used FPGA 
resources. The results are always referred to fingerprint 
images acquired by Secugen Hamster scanner. Similar results 
were obtained using the Biometrika FX2000 scanner. 
Table III. The used FPGA physical resources in terms of GCLKs (global 
FPGA clock), GCLKIOBs (clock for I/O management), IOBs (I/O blocks), 
SLICE (logical cells contained in the CLBs -  Configurable Logic Block), 
LUTs (Look-Up Table used as Boolean function generator). 
Resource 
Type 
Total 
Resource 
Used 
Resource Use Percentage 
GCLKs 4 2 50.00 
GCLKIOBs 4 1 25.00 
IOBs 404 273 67.57 
SLICEs 19200 19198 99.99 
LUTs 38400 37031 96.43 
 
D. Sensor Storage Capabilities of User’s Templates 
The embedded biometric sensor uses the RC1000 board 
RAM to store and manage user biometric identity. With more 
details, one memory bank has been used for temporary storage 
process required by fingerprint processing tasks, while the 
remaining 3 memory banks (6MB) have been used for to store 
user’s biometric templates. Each user template requires 512 
byte, considering a variable number of templates. Table IV 
shows the maximum number of users that can be enrolled on 
the sensor. 
Table IV. Maximum number of user templates stored in the board memory. 
Template Number 
(for each user) 
Sensor Storage Capability 
(number of users)  
2 6144 
3 4096 
4 3072 
 
E. Recognitions Rates 
System recognition performance has been evaluated 
through FAR and FRR indexes. An ideal recognition system 
would have FAR and FRR values equal to zero. However, in a 
real system, these indexes will be different from zero. A good 
processing strategies aims to reduce authentication faults in 
terms of false accepted users and false rejected users. In order 
to obtain a better validation of FAR and FRR indexes different 
tests have been performed on three databases: 
 FVC2002/DB2 database is composed of 80 
fingerprint images, acquired from 10 individuals (8 
fingerprints for each individual). The image 
dimensions are 296x560 pixels obtained from the 
scanner Biometrika FX2000. 
 CSAI/Biometrika database is a proprietary database 
composed of 365 fingerprint images of 73 individuals 
(5 fingerprints for each individual). The image 
dimensions are 296x560 pixels obtained from the 
scanner Biometrika FX2000 [17]. 
 CSAI/Secugen database is a proprietary database 
composed of 352 fingerprint images of 88 individuals 
(4 fingerprints for each individual). The image 
dimensions are 300x260 pixels obtained from the 
scanner Secugen Hamster FDP02 [16]. 
Table V shows FAR and FRR recognition rates obtained 
with the performed tests on the above described databases. 
Firstly, the prototyped fingerprint recognizer has been tested 
using the FVC database, necessary to obtain an evaluation on 
a standard database of the proposed approach.  
Table V. Recognition results of the implemented sensor on the tested 
databases. 
Database FAR (%) FRR (%) 
FVC2002/DB2 1.52 20.35 
CSAI/Biometrika 0.73 9.21 
CSAI/Secugen 1.07 8.33 
 
Subsequently, two different tests have been performed of 
the CSAI/Biometrika and CSAI/Secugen proprietary 
databases: in these last two cases, the system recognition 
performance is substantially improved respect FVC database 
test. This improvement is due considering that FVC is an 
official database used expressly to perform comparable tests 
on biometric systems. With more details, for the indexes 
calculation, some thresholds of coincident minutiae have been 
fixed: these thresholds define how much similar have to be 
two biometric signatures to give a positive matching. Also, has 
been considered the number of biometric templates with which 
to perform the comparison. This means that during the 
matching the biometric template obtained by the on-line 
fingerprint has been compared with 2, 3 or 4 templates stored 
in the sensor database. To increase the clearness of the 
proposed approach, the following Table VI shows the FAR-
FRR pairs obtained on the CSAI/Secugen database, 
considering different templates and minutiae number. 
The relative Fig.5 shows the FAR and FRR curves when 
fingerprint matching is performed using 2 fingerprint 
templates. A trade-off is necessary for optimal choice of FAR 
and FRR indexes. Table VI shows a possible optimal choice of 
the FAR and FRR pair (FAR=1.07% and FRR=8.33%) for the 
proposed system, obtained requiring the 95% of matched 
minutiae and 2 templates. The experimental trials involving 
the highest number of fingerprint templates (4) denote a low 
FAR but a high and unfeasible FRR 
Table VI. FAR and FRR indexes with different percentage of minutiae and 
different number of enrolled user templates. 
Percentage 
Minutiae 93% 95% 97% 
Template 
Number 
FAR 
(%) 
FRR 
(%) 
FAR 
(%) 
FRR 
(%) 
FAR 
(%) 
FRR 
(%) 
2 1.68 7.29 1.07 8.33 0.98 11.46 
3 1.12 17.71 0.78 22.92 0.71 26.04 
4 0.87 40.63 0.60 46.88 0.41 52.08 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. FAR and FRR curves when fingerprint matching is performed using 2 
fingerprint templates. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this work the study and the implementation of a 
fingerprints-based embedded biometric system for personal 
ubiquitous authentication and identity management has been 
proposed. An ubiquitous environment needs many 
authentication sensors for users recognition and their secure 
access to services and resources. In order to reach the 
objectives related to both security levels and performance in 
ubiquitous environments, the authors have designed and 
prototyped a self-contained sensor based on FPGA 
technologies. The entire encrypted user database is stored on 
the board RA8M. Each user optimized biometric template 
requires only 512 bytes, so a single board can store more than 
6000 user biometric templates. The embedded sensor 
prototype has been tested on three databases: the FVC2002 
reference database, the CSAI/Biometrika proprietary database, 
and the CSAI/Secugen proprietary database. System 
performance has been evaluated using FAR and FRR indexes. 
The best achieved FAR and FRR indexes are respectively 
1.07% and 8.33%, with an elaboration time of 183.32 ms and 
a working frequency of 22.5 MHz. The low working 
frequency suggests interesting considerations for the 
employment on the embedded recognizer in portable devices, 
since one of the techniques used to reduce device power 
consumption is to have a low working frequency with an 
adequate processing time for the device. 
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